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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1988) and Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2801(8)(1997).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Appellee agrees with the Statement of the Issues and Standard
of Review provided in the Appellant's brief.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 24:
"All Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."
14th Amendment, United States Constitution:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

l

Section 34A-2-413(5), Utah Code Annotated (1997):
Not withstanding the minimum rate established in
Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the
employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employer's
Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received
compensation from the employer or the employer's
insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities
amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the
applicable total disability compensation rate, shall
be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the
dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security
retirement benefits received by the employee during
the same period. (Emphasis added).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Merrill filed an Application for Hearing on February 21, 2003
seeking payment of permanent total disability compensation from his
employer, Vermax of Florida, Inc., related to industrial accidents on
May 14, 1998 and April 13, 2001. (R. at 1-7). Wausau provided
workers' compensation coverage to the employer on May 14, 1998,
and the Workers' Compensation Fund provided coverage for the April
13, 2001 accident. (R. at 12-17).
The Administrative Law Judge held an evidentiary hearing on
November 13, 2004. (R. at 35). On April 29, 2004, the
Administrative Law Judge issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
2

Law and Order finding Mr. Merrill permanently and totally disabled on
August 28, 2001 as a result of his May 14, 1998 accident. (R. at 1934). The Administrative Law Judge afforded Wausau 10 days from
the date of that Order to advise the commission whether it wished to
file a re-employment plan. (R. 33).
3.

Wausau appealed the Order, challenging the Administrative Law
Judge's conclusion that the May 14, 1998 accident was the direct
cause of Mr. Merrill's subsequent permanent total disability.
Wausau also objected to the short, 10 day period afforded by the
Administrative Law Judge, for Wausau to decide whether to submit a
re-employment plan. (R. at 41-55).

4.

The Labor Commission affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's
decision regarding the cause of Mr. Merrill's permanent total
disability, but afforded Wausau an opportunity to submit a reemployment plan under Section 34A-2-413(6) on remand to the
Administrative Law Judge. (R. at 65-69).

5.

The ALJ issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on
March 24, 2005 awarding permanent total disability compensation.
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The Order failed to consider the offset provisions contained in
Section 34A-2-413(5). (R. at 78-83).
6.

Wausau filed a Motion for Review on April 7, 2005, requesting the
commission address the statutory offsets provided in Sections 34A2-413(4) and 34A-2-413(5). (R. 84-87).

7.

The Appeals Board of the Labor Commission issued an Order of
Remand on February 1, 2006, returning this matter to the
Administrative Law Judge to address the appropriateness of the
statutory offsets. (R. 105-107). The Administrative Law Judge
scheduled briefing deadlines and a hearing on April 16, 2006, to
receive oral argument regarding Wausau's request for language
clarifying their entitlement to the statutory offsets. (R. at 109-110)

8.

The Administrative Law Judge issued a Supplemental Order on
Remand on May 17, 2006. (R. at 131-137).

9.

Mr. Merrill filed a Motion for Review on June 7, 2006 alleging that the
offset of one-half of the Social Security Retirement benefits provided
by Section 34A-2-413(5) is unconstitutional. (R. at 138-142).

10.

The Utah Labor Commission issued an Order Denying the Motion for
Review on June 29, 2006. (R. at 154-156).

4

11.

Mr. Merrill filed a Petition for Review with the Utah Court of Appeals
on July 28, 2006.
FACTS
The facts are not in dispute in this matter.

1.

Mr. Merrill sustained a low back injury at work on May 14, 1998 while
working for Vermax of Florida, Inc.

2.

Vermax of Florida, Inc. was insured by Wausau Business Insurance
on May 14, 1998.

3.

Wausau paid medical expenses as well as compensation for a 7%
whole man permanent impairment rating, or 21.84 weeks at $310 per
week, for a total of $6,770.40 in permanent partial disability
compensation, related to the May 14, 1998 accident.

4.

Mr. Merrill missed no time from work as a result of the May 14, 1998
accident.

5.

He suffered another industrial injury, found by the commission to
have caused a temporary aggravation of his underlying back
condition, on April 13, 2001. On April 13, 2001, Vermax of Florida,
Inc. was insured by the Workers' Compensation Fund.

5

6.

Mr. Merrill continued to work following the April 13, 2001 accident,
until August 28, 2001, when he discontinued working.

7.

The Labor Commission awarded Mr. Merrill permanent total disability
compensation at the rate of $395 per week, beginning on August 28,
2001. Mr. Merrill's permanent total disability was found to be the
result of the May 14, 1998 accident.

8.

Mr. Merrill's date of birth is December 29, 1937. Based upon his
date of birth, he reached "full retirement age" for Social Security
Retirement benefits, at age 65. Mr. Merrill is currently receiving
Social Security Retirement benefits.

9.

Pursuant to Section 34A-2-413(5), after Mr. Merrill has received six
years of permanent total disability compensation benefits, his
benefits "shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the
dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits
received" by him during the same period.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The "reverse offset" provision of § 34A-2-413(5) clearly and

unambiguously mandates that permanent total disability compensation
must be reduced by one-half of the injured worker's Social Security

6

retirement benefit. This "reverse offset" is rationally related to legitimate
state interests of avoiding double payment of wage loss benefits by the
employer and controlling the cost of workers' compensation insurance.
The Utah Legislature carefully crafted this "reverse offset" to allow the
injured worker to keep the portion of the Social Security retirement benefit
for which he paid premiums through payroll taxes. Conversely, the offset
relieves the employer from paying twice, one half of the Social Security
retirement benefit and full workers' compensation benefits, for the same
loss of earning capacity. Because the statutory "reverse offset" is
rationally related to legitimate state purposes, the statute does not violate
the provisions of the Equal Protection Clause or the Utah Constitution.
ARGUMENT
Workers' compensation is a system of statutorily created benefits
designed to protect injured workers and employers from the uncertainty of
pursuing a personal injury negligence action for injuries that occur at work.
This system provides the injured worker certain benefits under a "no fault"
system so long as the injury is causally related to the employment. The
employer receives the benefit of more predictable benefits and the
protection of the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation

7

Act. See generally,

LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW,

§ 1.03

(Matthew Bender & Co. 2006). Most workers' compensation claims are
accepted and paid without dispute by the employer or its insurance carrier.
Wage replacement benefits and medical expenses are paid pursuant to the
statute and the injured worker is returned to work. When there are
disputes between the parties related to the compensability or extent of the
injury, the injured worker's claim is adjudicated before the Labor
Commission. The workers' compensation system is designed to benefit
both the injured worker and the employer. idMr. Merrill argues that the offset provision contained in § 34A-2413(5) is unconstitutional because it will reduce his workers' compensation
permanent total disability benefits after the first 312 weeks, or 6 years, of
benefits have been paid. Mr. Merrill argues that the statutory offset of
workers' compensation benefits against his Social Security retirement
benefits subjects him to unlawful discrimination based on his age under the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. For the
reasons outlined below, Wausau submits that the "reverse offset" provision
of the Workers' Compensation Act is constitutional.

8

Age is not considered a suspect class subject to strict scrutiny under
the federal Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia. 427 U.S.
307, 313-314 (1976). In this regard, the Murgia Court observed, that "older
persons, again, unlike those who suffer discrimination on the basis of race
or gender, have not been subjected to a 'history of purposeful unequal
treatment.'" Murgia, at 313. "Old age also does not define a discrete and
insular minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans,
will experience it." Murgia at 313-314. "States may discriminate on the
basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age
classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
The rationality commanded by the Equal Protection Clause does not
require States to match age distinctions and the legitimate interests they
serve with razorlike precision. Rather, a state may rely on age as a proxy
for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are relevant to the
State's legitimate interests. That age proves to be an inadequate proxy in
any individual case is irrelevant" Kimel et al. v. Florida Bd. of Regents, et
aL, 528 U.S.62, 83 (2000). Therefore, Mr. Merrill's claim of statutory
discrimination based on his age is reviewed under the "rational basis"
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standard. Mr. Merrill's equal protection argument under the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot succeed unless he can show this Court that the
"reverse offset" provision of § 34A-2-413(5) is not rationally related to a
legitimate state purpose.
The Utah Court of Appeals previously reviewed the constitutionality
of a Social Security offset provision similar to that of § 34A-2-413(5) in the
context of an offset of unemployment benefits against Social Security
retirement benefits. Harrington v. Labor Commission. 942 P.2d 961 (Ut.
App. 1997). In Harrington, the Court concluded that the statutory language
requiring the offset was clear and unambiguous and was rationally related
to legitimate state interests. Id. at 965-966. The Harrington Court
explained:
Harrington also asserts that Utah's interpretation of the federal
statute violates his equal protection rights under the United
States Constitution. In addressing a similar argument, the
Edwards court held that Colorado's interpretation of section
3304(a)(15)(A)(l) as requiring application of the offset to all
Social Security recipients did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution because there were
"plausible reasons for selecting social security recipients."
(Citation omitted). First, Social Security "duplicates
unemployment insurance as a public wage replacement
program." (Citation omitted). Second, "the blanket application
of the offset to all social security recipients also may be justified
on the basis of ease of administration." (Citations omitted).
Likewise, we find no merit in Harrington's constitutional
10

challenge to the Utah Legislature's application of [the statute]
for the foregoing reasons and because the state has an interest
in maintaining the financial integrity of its unemployment
compensation program. (Citations omitted). We further note
that although Harrington characterizes the Legislature's
application of [the statute] as harsh, the judiciary is not
"licensed to attempt to soften the clear import of Congress'
chosen words whenever a court believes those words lead to a
harsh result." (Citations omitted).
Harrington at 16.
The legitimate state purposes articulated to support the offset in
Harrington likewise support the offset provided in the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act. Permanent total disability compensation and Social
Security retirement benefits both provide income to replace wages that the
injured worker is no longer able to earn. The legislature determined to
reduce workers' compensation benefits to avoid duplication of benefits
upon the injured worker reaching "retirement age." The legislature adopted
the "retirement age" at which an injured worker qualified for workers'
compensation benefits. Clearly, the state has a legitimate interest in
controlling the cost of workers' compensation insurance as well as
maintaining the financial integrity of Utah's Workers' Compensation
system. While it is unfortunate that the policy set forth in § 34A-2-413(5)
adversely affects Mr. Merrill's benefits, the distinction was made for a
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legitimate state purpose and need not be perfect to survive constitutional
scrutiny. Disability benefits awarded under workers' compensation are
intended to compensate an injured worker for loss of earning capacity:
The typical American compensation act relates the award to
the disability or loss of earning capacity, in many injuries fixing
arbitrary periods of disability for loss of particular members;
and, within the maximum and minimum limits, the amount of
the award will be a percentage of and therefore vary according
to previous weekly wages. This reference to previous wage
level is the significant point of distinction between the American
system and true social insurance, and shows that it is not an
outright relief plan, since, within limits, it relates the amount of
recovery to the amount of wage loss, makes no inquiry into
actual need by any sort of means test, and, with a few statutory
exceptions, makes no allowance even for presumed degree of
need because of number of dependents.
LARSON'S

supra §1.04(3).

"The purpose of the federal old age benefits of the Social Security
Act is to provide funds through contributions by employer and employee for
the decent support of elderly workmen who have ceased to labor." Social
Security Board v. Nierotko. 327 U.S. 358, 364 (1946). In addition to factors
related to impairment, education, transferable skills, and causation, § 34A2-413(1) requires evaluation of the effect of the injured worker's age on his
ability to work. Thus, both types of wage replacement benefits are similarly
intended to provide some financial support for one who is unable to work.
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The offset in §34A-2-413(5) considers that the employer and
employee each contribute one-half of the premium to the Social Security
Administration to fund the payment of retirement benefits to protect
workers from the loss of earning capacity incurred due to advanced age.
For this reason, the Utah Legislature provided an offset against 50% of the
Social Security retirement benefit.
Professor Larson notes that:
Seventeen states and the District of Columbia apply some kind
of deduction to compensation benefits for Social Security
benefits. . . It may seem odd, with the intense concern about
compensation costs, that the states have been so slow to
exploit this obvious way to reduce their compensation burden.
Although the federal offset in its present form was enacted in
1965, thus ensuring that there would be a ceiling on the
combined benefits and that the federal Social Security program
would reap all the benefit from the elimination of overlap, by
1975-10 years later- only three states had countered with
offset provisions of their own: Colorado, Montana, and
Minnesota. Then, rather rapidly, the number grew to about 16,
but with more than two-thirds of the states still foregoing this
cost cutting opportunity.
LARSON'S

supra §157.03(5)(a).

Professor Larson further observes:
It is interesting to note that in eight of the offset provisions, the
reduction applies only to one half of the federal benefit. This
has obviously been done in response to the familiar argument,
repeatedly heard in the debates on the Social Security Reform
Act offset provision, that, since the employee has contributed
13

half of the 'premium' for the employee's Social Security
coverage, it is unfair to deduct anything from an insurance
benefit paid for by his or her own contribution.
LARSON'S

supra §157.03(5)(e).

The offset provision contained in Section 34A-2-413(5) is designed to
avoid duplicate payment of wage loss benefits by the employer and control
the cost of workers' compensation insurance for Utah employers without
creating an unduly harsh result on the injured worker. The offset is clearly
and unambiguously set forth in the statute and is part of the legislature's
comprehensive plan to provide benefits for loss of earning capacity to Utah
injured workers without unfairly burdening Utah employers with double
payments intended to serve similar purposes.
The Utah legislature balanced the conflicting interests of injured
workers and employers when it created the offset in § 34A-2-413(5). This
partial offset protects the employee from an unreasonably harsh reduction
in benefits and protects the employer from double payment of wage loss
benefits. It also helps to limit the cost of workers' compensation insurance.
The "reverse offset" contained in § 34A-2-413(5) balances the competing
interests of employers and employees and helps to keep Utah's workers'
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compensation system viable.

This "reverse offset" prevents the employer

from paying twice for the same loss of earning capacity.
Mr. Merrill asserts that reducing costs for employers is not a
legitimate purpose for creating the offset at issue here. But Mr. Merrill fails
to recognize that every citizen of this State benefits from a no fault system
of workers' compensation that is affordable and sustainable, yet allows the
employee to retain the full measure of Social Security retirement benefits
for which he paid. Clearly, these reasons are sufficient to show legitimate
bases for the offset provided in § 34A-2-413(5).
CONCLUSION
The Social Security Retirement benefit offset in Utah's permanent
total disability statute, Section 34A-2-413(5) is constitutional. The Utah
legislature carefully crafted this offset to balance the interests of the
employee and employer, and to control the cost of Utah' s workers'
compensation insurance to keep the system viable and its insurers, solvent
while still affording injured workers lifetime compensation for loss of
earning capacity.
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Respectfully submitted this

day of

U££J2AVW^

2006.

BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

Sharon J. Eble/
Attorney for Appellees Vermax of
Florida, Inc. dba Dakota Cabinets
and/or Wausau Business Ins.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2006 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
TITLE 34A. UTAH LABOR CODE
CHAPTER 2. WORKERS'COMPENSATION ACT
PART 4. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (2006)
§ 34A-2-413. Permanent total disability - Amount of payments ~ Rehabilitation

(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or occupational disease, the
employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section.
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee must prove by a
preponderance of evidence that:
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as a result of the
industrial accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of the employee's permanent total
disability.
(c) To establish that an employee is permanently totally disabled the employee must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the employee's ability to do
basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments prevent the employee
from performing the essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the
time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability
claim; and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's:
(A) age;
(B) education;
(C) past work experience;
(D) medical capacity; and
(E) residual functional capacity.
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than those provided under this chapter
and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant:
(i) may be presented to the commission;
(ii) is not binding; and
(iii) creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease
Act.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement, compensation shall be

66- 2/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows:
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury;
(b) compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $ 45 per week, plus $ 5 for a dependent spouse,
plus $ 5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent minor children, but
not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the
employee at the time of the injury; and
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection (2)(b) shall be 36%
of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) This Subsection (3) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of
the employee's employment on or before June 30, 1994.
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total disability
compensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in effect on the date of injury.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any combination of
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial
Noise, in excess of the amount of compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(d) After an employee has received compensation from the employee's employer, its insurance carrier, or the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the
applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining
permanent total disability compensation.
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its insurance
carrier has satisfied its liability under this Subsection (3) or Section 34A-2-703.
(4) This Subsection (4) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of
the employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994.
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability compensation.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any combination of
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial
Noise, in excess of the amount of compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the employer or its insurance carrier by
reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks.
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the employer,
its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received compensation from the
employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of
compensation at the applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by
the dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same
period.
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the
parties, until:
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to
Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative law judge:

(A) a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably designed to return
the employee to gainful employment; or
(B) notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; and
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise stipulated, to:
(A) consider evidence regarding rehabilitation; and
(B) review any reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier under Subsection
(6)(a)(ii).
(b) Before commencing the procedure required by Subsection (6)(a), the administrative law judge shall order:
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's
subsistence; and
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due the employee.
(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a), an order for payment of benefits described in Subsection (6)(b) is
considered a final order for purposes of Section 34A-2-212.
(d) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability payments made under
Subsection (6)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act.
(e) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit a reemployment plan. If the employer or
its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the plan is subject to Subsections (6)(e)(i) through (iii).
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability compensation benefits, job placement
services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment funded by the employer or its insurance carrier.
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for the employee's
subsistence during the rehabilitation process.
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The employer's or
insurance carrier's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the administrative law judge
on the administrative law judge's own motion to make a final decision of permanent total disability.
(f) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the administrative
law judge shall order that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits.
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as
determined by a final order of the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends:
(i) with the death of the employee; or
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work.
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a permanently totally disabled employee
reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job earning at least minimum wage provided that employment
may not be required to the extent that it would disqualify the employee from Social Security disability benefits.
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement and employment process and accept the reasonable,
medically appropriate, part-time work.
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the work provided under
Subsection (7)(b) exceeds $ 500, the employer or insurance carrier may reduce the employee's permanent total
disability compensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess of $ 500.
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a permanently totally
disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate, part-time work subject to the offset provisions contained in
Subsection (7)(d).
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time work and offset.

(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under this Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8, Adjudication.
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the burden of proof to show that medically appropriate
part-time work is available.
(h) The administrative law judge may:
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job that would require the employee to undertake work
exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual functional capacity or for good cause; or
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability benefits as provided in
Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time employment has been offered but the employee
has failed to fully cooperate.
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the employee has
some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability.
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not entitled to disability compensation, unless
the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss without prejudice the claim for benefits of an
employee if the administrative law judge finds that the employee fails to fully cooperate, unless the administrative
law judge states specific findings on the record justifying dismissal with prejudice.
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both legs, both
eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated
according to this section.
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (10)(a) is final.
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a permanent total disability claim,
except those based on Subsection (10), for which the insurer or self-insured employer had or has payment
responsibility to determine whether the worker remains permanently totally disabled.
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three years after an award is final, unless good
cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to allow more frequent reexaminations.
(c) The reexamination may include:
(i) the review of medical records;
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical evaluations;
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and retraining efforts;
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns;
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or questionnaires approved by the division.
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for the cost of a reexamination with appropriate employee
reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel allowance and per diem as well as reasonable expert witness
fees incurred by the employee in supporting the employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at the time
of reexamination.
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a permanent total disability
finding, an administrative law judge may order the suspension of the employee's permanent total disability benefits
until the employee cooperates with the reexamination.
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total disability finding reveal evidence that reasonably raises
the issue of an employee's continued entitlement to permanent total disability compensation benefits, an insurer or
self-insured employer may petition the Division of Adjudication for a rehearing on that issue. The petition shall be
accompanied by documentation supporting the insurer's or self-insured employer's belief that the employee is no
longer permanently totally disabled.

(ii) If the petition under Subsection (1 l)(f)(i) demonstrates good cause, as determined by the Division of
Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall adjudicate the issue at a hearing.
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work may not be the sole
basis for termination of an employee's permanent total disability entitlement, but the evidence of the employee's
participation in medically appropriate, part-time work under Subsection (7) may be considered in the reexamination
or hearing with other evidence relating to the employee's status and condition.
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge may award reasonable attorneys fees
to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the employee's interests with respect to reexamination of the
permanent total disability finding, except if the employee does not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $ 1,000.
The attorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier in addition to the permanent total disability
compensation benefits due.
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication if the employee fully cooperates, each insurer, selfinsured employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall continue to pay the permanent total disability
compensation benefits due the employee.
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held
invalid, the remainder of this section shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
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1992, ch. 53, § 2; 1994, ch. 266, § 2; 1995, ch. 177, § 2; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 156; renumbered by
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NOTES:
REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. -Laws 1988, ch. 116, § 4 repeals former § 35-1-67, as last amended by
Laws 1985, ch. 160, § 1, relating to permanent total disability, effective July 1, 1988, and enacts the present section.
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2005 amendment, effective May 2, 2005, substituted "Before commencing the
procedure required by Subsection (6)(a)" for "Prior to the finding becoming final" in Subsection (6)(b); added
Subsection (6)(c); and made related and stylistic changes throughout the section.
The 2006 amendment, effective May 1, 2006, substituted "must prove" for "has the burden of proof to show" in the
introductory clause in Subsection (l)(b) and rewrote the introduction to Subsection (l)(c), which read: "To find an
employee permanently disabled, the commission shall conclude that."
LEGISLATIVE INTENT. -Laws 2006, ch. 295, which amended this section, provides in § 8 that the amendments
are to be "interpreted as merely clarifying an existing principle that the employee bears the burden of proving that the
employee is permanently totally disabled based on those factors listed as matters on which the commission is to
make a conclusion in Subsection 34A-2-413 (l)(c), as enacted before the amendments of this bill."

